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Abstract
After distinguishing three conceptions of virtue and its impact on ordi nary 
attachments to external goods such as social status, power, friends, and 
wealth, this paper argues that the Analects is most charitably interpreted 
as endorsing the whole-hearted internalization conception, on which 
virtue reforms but does not completely extinguish ordinary attachments 
to external goods. I begin by building on Amy Olberding’s attack on the 
ex tinguishing attachments conception, but go on to criticize her alter-
native, resolute sacrifice conception, on which the virtuous retain their 
ordinary attachments to external goods but are able to master them and 
willingly settle for virtue. I argue that we should reject this view because, 
unlike the wholehearted internalization conception, it cannot capture the 
facts that virtue silences or attenuates attachment to viciously obtained 
external goods and that virtue grounds positive emotional and cognitive 
self-assessments that are incompatible with some ordinary attachments to 
external goods.
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1.  
Across the millennia, many if not most people live their lives in pur-
suit of what we could call conventional success, and, again across the 
millennia, philosophers have argued that this is a mistake. Specific 
conceptions of conventional success vary from culture to culture and 
person to person but they typically include conventional goods (often 
called external goods or externalities by philosophers)1 such as health 
and physical strength, power and social status, profit and material 
wealth, pleasure and luxury, flourishing friends and family, and 
leaving a significant mark on the world. The pursuit of conventional 
success certainly does not require, and is often at odds with, the 
earnest pursuit of sagely or saintly virtue or a life-defining devotion 
to wisdom, beauty, or knowledge so it is no surprise that philo sophers 
are thought of as unconventional seducers of the young. Emerging 
adults who are tempted by philosophers to make life shaping choices 
with an eye to love, art, virtue, or a noble cause instead of con ven-
tional success are liable to be told that this is nothing but the naïve 
idealism of youth. Parents, politicians, and even alleged friends often 
assure budding adults that when they are older and wiser they will 
regret any failures to “be realistic.” They often tell the young to focus 
on what matters in the “real world,” namely the conventional world 
in which conventional goods and success are taken to be of prime 
importance.
Given that the pursuit of conventional success does not require 
and might be at odds with the pursuit of virtue and wisdom, it is 
no surprise that rebels such as Socrates, Aquinas, the Buddha, and 
Confucius argue that it is both imprudent (bad for us) and foolish (a 
regrettable, or even shameful, waste) to devote our lives to the ac-
1 Roughly, external goods are putative goods that are available to the virtuous and 
vicious alike and they are called “external” because western moral philosophers such 
as Socrates and Plato take virtue to constitute the inner good of the soul. Olberding 
(2013) uses “ordinary, prosaic goods” but I think “conventional” is better because it 
highlights the possibility that philosophers aim to buck conventional thinking about 
these goods and the wisdom of devoting one’s life to getting them. Refer to Olberding 
(2013, 429n13) where she discusses the term “external goods.”
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cumulation of conventional goods. In the first place, they maintain 
that it is a mistake to pursue conventional goods and success instead 
of, or at the price of, virtue. Second, they all hold that one needs to 
be virtuous to have a proper attitude toward or to make proper use 
of conventional goods such as health, a good reputation, material 
wealth and comfort, friends and family, They hold that to live well 
we must put conventional goods in their proper place. We must stop 
idolizing them and orient our lives toward more important and noble 
ends; and that means developing or cultivating virtue.
This essay focuses on the Confucian Analects and the attitude or 
attitudes that it suggests that the virtuous have toward conventional 
goods and success. I mention the possibility of multiple attitudes 
or views because, as Olberding (2013) makes clear, the text of the 
Analects can appear to contain conflicting passages that suggest 
different, incompatible answers to questions about how virtue 
shapes attachment to conventional goods.  
First, there are more theoretical, argumentative, and didactic 
passages that might be taken to suggest that the virtuous completely 
shed or transcend ordinary attachments to conventional, external 
goods and success.2 For example, consider the Analects 4.5 and 7.16:
The Master said, “Wealth and social eminence are things that all 
people desire, and yet unless they are acquired in the proper way  
I will not abide them. Poverty and disgrace are things that all people 
hate, and yet unless they are avoided in the proper way I will not 
despise them.” 
“If the gentleman abandons Goodness, how can he merit the 
name? The gentleman does not go against Goodness for the amount 
of time required to finish a meal. Even in times of urgency or dis tress, 
he necessarily accords with it.”3 
2 See Section 3 of Olberding (2013). Of course, some of these have dramatic aspects
I use “didactic” and “dramatic” to refer to passages that seem to support the shedding 
concern and resolute sacrifice conceptions of virtue respectively because it is con-
venient and because those terms reflect the characteristic differences between the two 
types of passages.  
3 All translations are from Slingerland (2003).
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The Master said, “Eating plain food and drinking water, having only 
your bent arm for a pillowˌcertainly there is joy to be found in this! 
Wealth and eminence attained improperly concern me no more 
than the floating clouds.”
In his commentary, Slingerland maintains that these and other di d actic 
passages4 indicate, “the gentleman’s independence from ex ter nalities” 
(2003, 61). He claims that the Analects in general expresses the view 
that, “the true gentleman5 is dedicated to the Way as an end in itself, 
and does not pursue it for the sake of external goods . . . as a result, he 
embodies the Way unselfconsciously and effortlessly, and derives a 
constant joy that renders him indifferent to externalities” (2003, 31). 
He thereby apparently adopts the shedding conventional concerns 
conception of virtue,6 on which virtue utterly transforms ordinary 
thinking about well-being and how to live well. On this view, the 
virtuous embody the view that conventional success and failure simply 
have no impact on the quality of one’s life, and this allows them to 
joyfully follow the righteous course even when it leads to conventional 
failure or requires conventional sacrifice.
In apparent contrast to these didactic passages, there are more 
dramatic passages in which Confucius reacts to the loss or lack 
of conventional goods in his own life. Assuming that Confucius is 
some sort of exemplar of virtue, his reactions can seem7 to conflict 
with the idea that the virtuous are indifferent to conventional goods 
or “externalities.” For example, these passages depict Confucius as 
being dramatically upset (e.g. angry or sad) about losing his students 
4 In his commentary, Slingerland connects the theme of indifference to lack of orien-
tation towards externalities with 1.14, 4.2, 4.5, 4.9, 4.16, 6.11, 7.12, 7.16, 7.19, 8.12, 9.29, 14.1, 
14.24, 15.32. 
5 It is generally agreed that the terms translated as “gentleman” and “true gentleman” 
refer to virtuous exemplars of some sort or other.
6 Olberding calls this view “moral maturity as autonomy,” but I prefer a label that 
high lights the way virtue shapes attachment to conventional goods. However, 
like Olberding (2013, 433), following Annas (1998), I use “transform” and “alter” 
to distinguish the ways that one can picture virtue affecting ordinary assumptions 
about well-being and the well lived life.
7 See the response I develop on behalf of shedding concern interpreters in Section 3.
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and failing to influence rulers as he wishes he could. Take Analects 
11.9–10: 
When Yan Hui passed away, the Master lamented, “Oh! Heaven has 
bereft me!  Heaven has bereft me!”
When Yan Hui passed away, the Master cried for him excessively.  
The disciples reproved him, saying, “Master, surely you are showing 
excessive grief!”  The Master replied, “Am I showing excessive grief? 
Well, for whom would I show excessive grief, if not for this man?” 
Of course, we might answer the rhetorical question at the end of 
11.10 with “How about your wife?”; but, that aside, the passage can be 
taken to imply that the virtuous may or should care about more than 
virtue and that they may or should take more than virtue to impact 
their level of well-being.  
This is how Olberding takes things; she argues that various dra-
matic passages8 depict Confucius as a relatively down to earth guy, 
who cared and complained about the conventional failures and 
sacrificed “externalities” that marred his life. On her view, the virtuous 
have more or less typical or ordinary attachments to conventional 
goods and success, but they differ from the rest of us because they 
“resolutely regulate,” their attachments to conventional goods so that 
they never “trump” or “overmaster” their apt com mitments to doing 
the virtuous thing (2013, 433). On this resolute sacrifice conception9 
of virtue, virtue alters but does not radically transform ordinary 
thinking about well-being and how to live wellˌfor example, it leaves 
in place the assumption that conventional success and failure have a 
huge impact on the quality of our life but leads us to recognize that it 
is better to do the virtuous thing and have a lower quality of life than 
to abandon virtue in order to gain conventional goods or success. 
8 See Section 4 of Olberding. She points to the following passages: 5.7, 5.27, 9.9, 9.12, 9.13, 
9.14, 11.17, 11.26, 14.35, and 17.19. 
9 Olberding calls this view “moral maturity as settling,” but I prefer a label that high-
lights the way virtue shapes attachment to conventional goods.  
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In the light of the apparently conflicting (what I will call didactic 
and dramatic) passages, there are two interesting questions that 
readers of the Analects face. First, there is the interpretive or ex-
ege ti cal question about whether there is an account of how virtue 
shapes attachment to conventional goods that can explain all of 
the passages and yield a unified interpretation of the whole text. 
Second, there is the substantive question about whether there is 
an intuitively and philosophically plausible account of how virtue 
shapes attachment that is suggested by the Analects, i.e. an account 
we can accept or take seriously in our own lives. In what follows, I 
will address the exegetical question and the question about intuitive 
plausibility. In short, I will criticize both the shedding concern and 
resolute sacrifice conceptions of virtue and introduce a better, third 
optionˌwhat I call I call the wholehearted internalization conception 
of virtue. As I will explain, this conception is better than the other 
two because only it can ground a unifying interpretation of the 
Analects and fit with our ordinary intuitions or assumptions about 
virtue and the good life.  
My discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 more carefully de-
scribes the three conceptions of virtue and their implications for 
our guiding question. Section 3 critically assessess the shedding 
concern conception, starting from Olberding’s attacks on it. Section 4 
turns to the resolute sacrifice conception of virtue, which Olberding 
prefers. I argue it actually fares worse than the shedding concern 
conception when it comes to giving a unified reading of the dramatic 
and didactic passages and that it is also counter-intuitive for reasons 
that Olberding does not discuss. I conclude that we need to find a 
better third option that avoids the problems that bedevil the shedding 
concern and resolute sacrifice conceptions. Section 5 returns to the 
wholehearted internalization conception of virtue and explain why 
it is more in line with ordinary pretheoretical sensibilities and in - 
 tui tions than the resolute sacrifice or shedding concern conceptions 
and how it also grounds a unified interpretation of the Analects. 
Finally, Section 6 returns to the opening questions I raised about 
how virtue transforms ordinary attachments to conventional goods 
and success and explain how the wholehearted internalization 
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conception grounds answers that are more plausible than ones sug-
gested by the other conceptions.
2. 
Before we evaluate and build on Olberding’s discussion of the shed-
ding concern and resolute sacrifice conceptions of virtue, it will be 
useful to more carefully describe those views and the wholehearted 
internalization conception of virtue that I ultimately favor. To begin, 
it is worth noting that all three of these conceptions of virtue fit with 
the idea that Confucian virtue enables people to achieve a kind of 
reflective self-determination or autonomyˌan arguably essential 
part of a good or ethical human life that some older interpreters have 
taken the Confucians to ignore or dis-value.10 Following many other 
more recent interpreters,11 I dis agree and think that we can attribute 
the following view to various Confucian texts.
Virtuous Self-determination: Virtue involves (a) improving one’s 
character, interactions with others, and activities, (b) appreciating 
and valuing virtue in oneself and others, (c) noticing and disvaluing 
the lack of virtue in oneself and, to a lesser extent,12 in others, and 
(c) transforming and guiding one’s activity in the light of one’s apt 
appreciation of virtue and its absence in oneself and others. For one 
thing, the self-reflective appreciation of virtue leads the virtuous  
10 Fingarette (1972) is most commonly associated with this reading and he may have 
been influenced by western thinkers such as Hegel and Weber.
11 For a recent overview of related interpretive debates, see Kim (2013). 
12 There are passages in the Analects that suggest that virtue requires the ability or 
tendency to notice the lack of virtue in other people (e.g. 1.16, 2.9, 2.10, 4.7, 12.20; cf. the 
Great Learning 9.1). But there are also passages that suggest that the virtuous person’s 
awareness of, negative reactions to, and attempts to correct, her own lack of virtue 
should be more reliable and stronger than her awareness of, negative reactions to, 
and attempts to correct lack of virtue in other people (e.g., 1.4, 3.26, 4.17, 7.22). Fuller 
discussion of this issue would also need to take into account the different attitudes 
that the virtuous have when they inhabit specific roles such as teacher, ruler, parent, 
or child, and related Legalist attacks on Confucians discussed in Hutton (2008).
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to choose virtue instead of conventional goods if and when a choice 
must be made.13
While likely agreeing with this background view, advocates of the 
shedding concern, resolute sacrifice, and wholehearted internali-
zation conceptions provide us with different accounts of how virtue, 
and its self-reflective appreciation, shapes attachment to the various 
externalities that are conventionally taken to be good and bad, e.g. 
social affirmation and rejection, wealth and poverty, health and 
sickness, and refined and shabby material goods. Consider, first, the 
conception favored by interpreters such as Slingerland: 
Shedding Conventional Concerns: The virtuous person ceases to 
care about winning conventional goods and never chooses con-
ventional goods at the price of virtue. Her awareness of her degree 
of virtue completely determines her assessment of how well her 
life is going and this assessment is wholeheartedly embodied in her 
attitudes and actions (e.g. emotions and verbal statements). She 
presupposes that one’s degree of virtue is the only thing that affects 
one’s level of well-being and determines whether one is living a good, 
satisfactory life or not.14
13 See, for example 4.11. This appreciation of virtue should not be thought of as neces-
sarily propositional; see Darwall (2002) chapter four. In addition, it is worth noting 
that the sort of self-reflective appreciation of virtue need not be focused on the self 
or the virtuous person’s character.  Instead the appreciation can be responsive to 
the value of the virtuous person’s modes of activity and the ways in which he or she 
thinks and feels about, interacts with, and relates to others (and herself). This value 
will often be relational and can be second-personal in a broad sense. From what I 
can tell, Confucian thinking about virtue is better able to ground these views than 
Aristotelian thinking, but that is an issue in need of more exploration.  For a related 
discussion of virtue and social morality see Cokelet (2014).
14 Olberding (2013, 429) describes the relevant view as one on which becoming virtuous, 
“transforms how happiness and satisfaction will be constituted, such that being 
virtuous is the principal good of life, the good [one] wins for [oneself] independently of 
luck and from which comes profound joy.” I think we should distinguish between the 
view that only virtue affects one’s level of well-being and the view that our well-being 
is unaffected by luck. If the scope of the field in which one can engage in virtuous 
activity and interactions is conditioned by luck, then one might hold that virtue is all 
that matters when it comes to well-being but also hold that one’s level of well-being is 
subject to luck. For more on this version of the shedding concern view, see page 21. 
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On this view, the virtuous are always and everywhere free in the sense 
that they always whole-heartedly and joyfully choose the virtuous 
path as they navigate their way through life. Because they have trans-
cended conventional attachments to things such as fancy food and 
a soft bed and pillow, they never feel ambivalent about taking the 
“high road” of virtue, which sometimes lacks conventional goods 
or leads to conventional failure. In addition to this forward-looking 
attitude, the virtuous person’s indifference to conventional fortune 
is reflected in present and past-focused judgments and feelings 
about herself and her life; her judgements and feelings about how 
her life as a whole is turning out, about how well or poorly she has 
lived her life, and about herself are all unaffected by conventional 
factors such as her social standing or rejection, her material wealth 
or poverty, or her health and sickness. For example, on the shed-
ding concern conception, a virtuous person will feel no shame if, 
due to misfortune, she has to show up at a job interview or a fancy 
din ner with her prospective in-laws in worn, second-hand clothes 
(cf. Analects 9.27).15
Although Olberding recognizes that the didactic passages in the 
Analects can reasonably be taken to suggest the shedding concern 
conception of virtue, she argues in favor of a different conception 
that we can formulate as follows:
Resolute Sacrifice: The virtuous person cares about winning con-
ventional goods in ways that ordinary people do but she is resolutely 
committed to sacrificing all relevant conventional goods in order 
to follow the path of virtue and always acts on this commitment. 
Her assessment of how well her life is going reflects the view that 
both virtue and conventional goods impact one’s level of well-
being and whether one is living a good life or not. Her assumption 
that conventional goods sacrificed to pursue virtue have prudential 
value is wholeheartedly embodied in her attitudes and actions  
(e.g. emotions of anger, fear, and sadness). 
15 See Olberding’s discussion (2013, 421–422), including her reference to 9.27. 
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On this view, which is, incidentally, embraced by Immanuel Kant,16 
the virtuous are down to earth in the sense that they have the same 
sort of conventional attachments that the rest of us do. When the “high 
road” of virtue requires conventional loss or sacrifice, these virtuous 
people feel ambivalent but they are willing to settle for the better 
option, namely the path of virtue, and they feel good knowing they 
have what it takes to act in line with that choice. In addition to this 
forward looking attitude, the virtuous person’s ordinary attachments 
to conventional fortune are reflected in present and past-focused 
judgments and feelings about herself and her life; her judgements 
and feelings about how her life as a whole is turning out, about how 
well or poorly she has lived her life, and about herself all reflect her 
attachment to conventional factors such as her social standing or 
rejection, her material wealth or poverty, or her health and sickness. 
For example, Olberding interprets Confucius’ past-focused attitudes 
at the end of his life as follows: 
The cumulative complexity of [the virtuous exemplar’s] responses 
to his life are perhaps distilled in one final passage, one in which 
Confucius appears to summarize the mixed results of his life. Be-
lieving his death near, Confucius addresses Zilu’s disappointment 
with Confucius’ lack of success by noting the great consolation that 
he shall die among friends (Analects 9.12). But this is not all he says. 
He elaborates, “Even though I do not get a grand state funeral, I am 
hardly dying by the roadside,” an addendum that again suggests wit 
pitched at self-consolation. Confucius will “not get a grand state 
funeral” and, implicitly, did not get the life he wanted but, he dryly 
notes, things could be worse. (426)
Finally, I want to introduce the third conception of virtue, which I 
contend we should attribute to the Analects:
Wholehearted Internalized Virtue: Full virtue involves (a) im-
prov ing one’s character, interactions with others, and activities, 
(b) wholeheartedly appreciating and valuing virtue in oneself and 
16 See Baxley (2010a).
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others, (c) noticing and wholeheartedly disvaluing the actual or po-
tential lack of virtue in oneself, and (d) transforming and guiding 
one’s activity in the light of one’s apt appreciation of virtue and its 
absence in oneself and others. The self-reflective appreciation of 
virtue leads the virtuous to choose virtue instead of conventional 
goods if and when a choice must be made, to wholeheartedly spurn 
vice, and to stake their self-assessments on their degree of virtue 
instead of their social standing or conventional fortunes.
On this conception, the virtuous have some but not all of the attach-
ments to conventional goods that the rest of us do. Looking forward 
they have no desire for conventional goods attained by vicious 
means or goods whose general pursuit is inimical to virtue, so they 
can wholeheartedly and joyfully pursue the “high road” of virtue if 
and when it requires turning away from those. But in other cases, the 
virtuous will be willing to act virtuously while bearing misfortune 
but feel ambivalent about the conventional costs of righteousness. 
In addition to these forward-looking attitudes, the virtuous person’s 
reformed attachments to conventional fortune are reflected in present 
and past-focused judgments and feelings about herself and her life; 
her judgements and feelings about how her life as a whole is turning 
out, about how well or poorly she has lived her life, and about herself 
all reflect her reformed attachment to conventional factors such as 
her social standing or rejection, her material wealth or poverty, or 
her health and sickness. She might feel disappointed about having 
a meager, rather than grand, 80th birthday party but she would not 
feel ashamed as a result because she stakes her self-assessments on 
her degree of virtue not her conventional fortunes.17
3. 
Now that we have the different conceptions of virtue on the table, 
we are ready to start assessing them on exegetical and substantive 
17 For more details, see sections 4 and 5.
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grounds. To begin, we can consider Olberding’s two-step argument 
against the shedding concern conception. First, she argues that 
although there are didactic passages that can be taken to suggest 
the shedding concern reading, we should prefer a reading that also 
accounts for the dramatic passages that testify to Confucius’ com-
plaints (about conventional losses and failures). Olberding admits 
that when we take both kinds of passages into account the Analects, 
“appears to offer two bodies of testimony regarding the felt, 
experiential qualities of leading a life of virtue” (2013, 417), but she 
goes on to argue that while the shedding concern conception can 
explain the didactic but not the dramatic passages, there is a way 
for the advocate of the resolute sacrifice conception to account for 
both. Second, she argues that we should prefer the interpretation 
that is more in line with “ordinary pretheoretical sensibilities” (419– 
420) and that this tells strongly in favor of the resolute sacrifice 
conception. In short, she claims that the shedding concern view is 
out of step with ordinary sensibilities, because the virtuous person 
it depicts, “risks appearing insensate where the sorrows of ordinary 
lives and ordinary people are concerned” (432). The resolute sacrifice 
view, on the other hand, is sensitive to these sorrows because it 
entails that they are compatible with virtue. So, she con cludes that, 
on both exegetical and substantive grounds, resolute sacrifice is the 
way to go.
Olberding is surely right that we should prefer an interpretation 
that can account for both kinds of passages over one that can only 
explain one, but I don’t think she establishes that the shedding 
con cern conception fares worse on this exegetical score than the 
re solute sacrifice conception. To see why, we need to first consider 
her argument that fans of the shedding concern view, such as 
Slingerland, cannot explain the dramatic passages. She recognizes 
that fans of the shedding concern interpretation might respond to her 
initial observationˌthat the text at least seems to offer conflicting 
bodies of testimonyˌby showing how the shedding concern view 
can explain the dramatic passages that she takes to favor her resolute 
sacrifice approach. 
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To head off this line of response, Olberding considers some 
pos sible shedding concern explanations of the relevant dramatic 
passages and argues they are inadequate (430–431). For example, she 
mentions and rejects the proposal that Confucius’ complaints could be 
explained as manifestations of virtuous dismay at the bad character of 
the people and corrupt times with which he finds himself confronted. 
Olberding rightly rejects this suggestion because Confucius is depicted 
in dramatic passages as being upset about the impact of these people 
and time on his life, and not just about the fact that his world is peopled 
by corruption, bad luck, and vice. In addition, she argues that while 
shedding concern readers might try to explain specific reactions to 
conventional losses, such as Confucius’ sorrow at Yan Hui’s untimely 
death, as reactions that are themselves virtuous and that embody 
the proper spirit of the relevant rites, this strategy cannot explain 
the, “general frustration and despair Confucius sometimes appears 
to confess or a rather global despair about how one’s life is going” 
(431). For example, she points to her interpretation of Confucius’ past-
focused attitudes at the end of his life.18
Olberding does not consider, however, what I take to be the most 
promising approach that is open to shedding concern interpreters. 
On the shedding concern view, virtue involves assessing how well 
one’s life is going solely by appeal to the extent of one’s virtue, but 
this presumably includes assessment of both one’s inner virtue and 
character and the extent to which one is able to engage in virtuous 
activity and interaction. With the second aspect of the assessment 
in mind, the shedding concern interpreter can argue that Confucius’ 
complaints are an expression of his dismay at the way that the 
loss or lack of conventional goods narrows the field of (embodied, 
enacted) virtue in his life. Olberding rightly points out that Confucius’ 
complaints are not just targeted at specific losses and that they 
express a general dissatisfaction or disappointment with his life, but 
the fan of the shedding concern view can argue that this is because his 
life in general is shaped by a various conventionally bad things that 
narrow the amount or kinds of virtuous activities and interactions in 
18 See her reading of 9.12 quoted in the last section.
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which he can engage.19 On this view, conventional failures or losses 
do not in and of themselves lower one’s level of well-being, but they 
are often the occasion for a narrowed field of virtuous activity and 
interaction, and that narrowing is bad for you and an appropriate 
occasion for lament or anger. In other words, the virtuous are not 
attached to conventional goods per se but they are attached to the 
scope of their field of virtue and that is often subject to luck and 
depends on having various conventional goods.
Even if Olberding granted this response and admitted that the 
shedding concern conception can explain the didactic and dramatic 
passage, she could argue that the resolute sacrifice conception should 
be preferred for substantive (not exegetical) reasons. Specifically, 
she could appeal to her argument that we should prefer the resolute 
sacrifice conception to the shedding concern one because the former 
is more in line with the pretheoretical sensibilities of ordinary people 
or the explanation of the dramatic passages is more accord with 
those. As mentioned, she claims that the shedding concern view 
is problematic because it is out of step with ordinary pretheoretic 
sensibilities, because the virtuous person it depicts, “risks appearing 
insensate where the sorrows of ordinary lives and ordinary people 
are concerned.” She goes on to develop this worry as follows:  
 
If the Analects’ presentation of a good life indeed entails an ex-
quisitely refined species of joy and, moreover, sees this joy as 
profoundly motivating in living a life of virtue, the good life here 
appears to stand at a worrisomely far remove from ordinary lives 
and people. It promises something grand and ambitious, to be sure, 
but its very grandeur and ambition rather radically defies pre-
theoretical sensibilities, declaring as more experientially good than 
most a life, Confucius’ life, that transpires in conditions most people 
would find deplorable and cruelly tragic. Despite all of his life’s 
sorrows, we must believe, Confucius’ life is more abundantly joyful 
than most, he wins all he deeply wants and, by extension, all anyone 
should deeply want. (432)
19 As noted earlier, it can also picture the virtuous as ruing the reduced amount of good 
in the world and express virtuous sadness that honors the dead.  
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The first thing to note about this quote is that it reflects her failure 
to consider the version of the shedding concern view that I have 
introduced to explain the dramatic passages. If the shedding concern 
interpreter adopts my suggested response, then he has an easy 
response to the last line quoted above, namely that on his view 
Confucius does not win all that he deeply wants and, by extension, 
all anyone should deeply want. Even if one assesses one’s life only in 
terms of the virtue in it, one may want to have both good character 
and to embody that virtue in a wide field of relationships, activities, 
and situations. Confucius, on this way of thinking, is depicted as 
experiencing joy and equanimity because he has good character 
but complaining about his life because conventional failures have 
narrowed the field in which he can embody virtue and treat others well.
This shows that Olberding’s argument is unsound, but I think 
we can build a new, stronger argument for her conclusionˌthat 
if virtue involves shedding concern for conventional goods, then 
it puts one at a distance from (and might be thought to “radically 
defy”) many people’s pretheoretical sensibilities. To begin, imagine 
a virtuous person who loses her job, all her savings, and her home, 
and who is barely getting by in conventional terms at a shelter for 
the homeless. The shedding conventional concerns view of virtue 
entails that because this woman is virtuous she will simply not care 
that she is now homeless, jobless, and penniless unless, and then 
because, that narrows her field of virtuous activity. Presumably many 
people have pretheoretical sensibilities that reflect the assumption 
that conventional failure or loss is bad for you in and of itself and 
even if it does not narrow your field of virtue so this conception of 
virtue will conflict with their sensibilities. But things get even more 
problematic if we turn from the virtuous person’s attitudes towards 
her own conventional misfortune, to her attitude to the misfortune 
of others. For example, imagine that instead of the virtuous person 
falling on hard times, it is the virtuous person’s decent-but-far-from-
virtuous parent, child, or friend who becomes homeless, jobless, and 
penniless and is barely getting by living at a homeless shelter. 
If it is virtuous to be indifferent to conventional loss and lack in 
your own case, then it is presumably virtuous to be indifferent to 
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such loss and lack in other people’s case; so, the virtuous personˌ
according to the shedding concern conceptionˌwill not feel any 
sincere sympathy for those who are in bad conventional straights 
unless that narrows their field of virtue. That kind of attitude is likely 
to strain or break the bonds of affection, trust, and com mitment 
that the virtuous have with ordinary people, who still care about 
conventional goods and losses. In fact, it goes against many people’s 
pretheoretical sensibilities to think that a good parent, friend, or son, 
would feel no sorrow or sympathy for her child, friend, or father who 
is deeply upset about a conventional harm (for its own sake, so to 
speak). Imagine that Andy is close friends with Sue and Sue’s spouse 
unexpectedly dies. Andy is there for Sue as she mourns and is glad 
to also himself pay his respects to his lost friend. But later when 
Sue is remarried and mentions that she still misses her old spouse 
Andy responds by saying that she is not actually any worse off now 
because she has a new spouse and the lack of her old spouse is not 
stopping her from doing good or being a good person. Sue responds 
by saying that she feels like her life is missing something just 
because her old spouse is gone, and not because of how it affects her 
ability to be a good person. Andy thinks this feeling is unwarranted 
and that Sue would be better off, and more virtuous, without it. If 
you are like me, I think that this attitude shows that Andy is not 
being a good friend to Sue; and if you are like me, it conflicts with 
your pretheoretical intuitions about what a virtuous person would 
do. Moreover, my pretheoretical intuitions about this case hold up 
well when I think about the Confucian golden rule, which I take 
to represent an important part or measure of Confucian virtue. If 
I think about how I would want a friend to react if I become upset 
at the unlucky loss of conventional goods, I would want them to feel 
sincere sympathy for me and to respect my belief that I am worse 
off even if my field of virtue has not been restricted. If a supposed 
“virtuous friend” instead argued I should not be upset about the 
loss (of a spouse or pet or house for example) or that the loss was 
not bad for me, that would strike me as insensitive and strain our 
relationship. Presumably similar problems would crop up when the 
virtuous inhabit various other roles, e.g. being a parent or ruler or 
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leader of less than virtuous men and women (cf. Analects 7.11 and 7.13).
This new argument against the shedding concern conception 
of virtue follows Olberding in assuming that we should prefer a 
theory of virtue that fitsˌor at least does not defyˌthe pretheoretical 
sensibilities of “ordinary people.” But if we think about Confucius’ 
emphasis on ritual and the importance of good upbringing, we can 
easily imagine how a shedding concern interpreter might respond: 
he might raise worries about whether the relevant pretheoretical 
sensibilities are really the product of theoretically neutral, or 
ethically benign, cultural forces. For example, he could note that a 
strong attachment and belief in the prudential value of conventional 
goods can seem natural, if one is raised in an environment that 
strongly encourages those attitudes and this cultural environment 
might explain why some (but not all) human beings have pre-
theo retic sensibilities that jibe with the view that conventional 
suc cess and not just virtue matters when assessing how our lives 
are going. For example many of us live in cultures that celebrate 
conventional success and its pursuit, many of us are taught to value 
our education, career options, and relationships as means to or 
aspects of conventional success, and many of us know parents who 
place prime importance on how well, in conventional terms, their 
children are doing.20 As mentioned at the outset, in many cultures or 
sub-cultures, emerging adults who are tempted to make life-shaping 
choices with an eye to love, art, virtue, or a noble cause instead of 
conventional success are liable to be told that this is nothing but 
the naive idealism of youth. It would be no surprise if people raised 
under these kinds of conditions have pretheoretical sensitivities that 
clash with the shedding concern view. And perhaps people raised 
in a very different culture, with different rituals and distributions of 
rewards and recognition, would have pretheoretical sensibilities that 
would resonate with that view and conflict with the assumption that 
it is virtuous to care about conventional goods for their own sakes. 
20 They might express fear or disappointment when a son faces conventional failure 
or when a daughter in art school rebelliously questions the value or importance of 
achieving conventional success.
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In the absence of empirical investigation, it is hard to know how 
to fully assess the strength of the argument I have given and the 
proposed response.21 The claim that the shedding concern view 
conflicts with “ordinary” pretheoretical sensibilities will surely re-
sonate with many readersˌas I have explained, it resonates with 
me. But it is very hard to determine how much weight these sensi-
bilities should be given especially when we are talking about how 
to interpret a philosopher who was explicitly concerned about the 
bad impact that cultural institutions and education can have on 
our sensibilities. I think a stronger argument would involve the 
claim that the shedding concern conception conflicts with claims 
about how a well-functioning human being would inhabit various 
natural human relationships (parent, friend, etc.) well, but that would 
require appeal to a substantive account of human nature and natural 
relationshipsˌa topic for another paper.22  With that all said, I will 
for now simply agree with Olberding that, if possible, it would be best 
if we can improve on the shedding concern conception of virtue. 
4.
Olberding argues that we should reject the shedding concern con cep-
tion of virtue and adopt the resolute sacrifice conception instead. In 
this section, I examine the resolute sacrifice conception and argue that 
it actually has more problems than the shedding concern conception. 
Specifically, it is unable to ground a unified interpretation of the more 
didactic and dramatic passages in the Analects and it conflicts with 
pretheoretic assumptions about virtue and how the virtuous inhabit 
relationships well (just as the shedding concern conception does).
21 For some empirical evidence that living under modern individualist capitalist 
conditions leads people to an overvalue conventional goods, see Kasser (2002). For 
evidence that it generates a bad environment for virtue development, see Narvaez 
(2016). This issue needs more systematic discussion.  
22 For naturalist friendly steps in this direction, see Fowers (2015), Navarez (2016), and 
Flanagan (2017). 
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In her essay, Olberding paints an appealing picture of virtue under-
stood as resolute sacrifice.
Rather than ceasing to care about ordinary, prosaic goods, [the 
virtuous person] engages in a continuous process of calibrating his 
desires, resolutely regulating them so that his caring about prosaic 
goods never trumps or overmasters his desire for the admirable. 
That is, he resolves never to betray the admirable in pursuit of 
the desirable, even while he wants both. . . . Insofar as Confucius 
wins some freedom in this alteration, it is the more modest free-
dom achieved by a clarity about one’s priorities that precludes 
existentially destabilizing confusion about what to do where 
one must lose part of what one wants. This achieved existential 
constancy and resolve does not, however, preclude the pain of 
those losses. . . . Confucius rues his lack of recognition and position, 
grieves his losses, and fancifully imagines escape routes from his 
life, but what he does not rue is what he has done in life. (433)
As mentioned in Section 2, on this view the virtuous person is often 
ambivalent about choosing the path of virtue, but she is dead set on 
choosing it. Moreover, her judgements and feelings about how her 
life as a whole is turning out, about how well or poorly she has lived 
her life, and about herself also reflect her attachment to conventional 
factors such as her social standing or rejection, her material wealth 
or poverty, or her health and sickness. 
At first blush, it is hard to see how someone adopting this ap-
proach can explain the (didactic) passage in the Analects which 
suggest that the virtuous differ from the rest of us in that they (i) are 
able to joyfully take the high road and (ii) feel good about themselves 
because they are virtuous. Olberding admirably addresses this point 
and offers a strategy for explaining these passages, which seem 
at first pass to speak in favor of the shedding concern conception. 
She writes:
What consistently privileging the admirable has won for Confucius 
is not clean joy but a clean conscience. . . [his] joy here is not in 
liberation from challenge but in challenge well met, a joy that comes 
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from serially and consistently doing well what is radically difficult to 
do, loving the way even where it is most difficult to love.” (434)
The (didactic) passages rehearse re-assurances that the costs of  
fol lowing the way are worth it, reminding the practitioner, for ex-
ample, of pleasures his life can afford even in adversity and invoking 
his admiration for exemplars in whose noble company persistence 
will place him. They encourage him to seek out subtler species of  
joy that might, in better conditions, escape notice, alerting him to the 
profundity of pleasures found in exercising one’s own resolve, doing 
so with beloved companions, meeting the end of life without regret 
over one’s conduct, and so forth. . . . Joy is not refined away from 
feeling the vicissitudes of fate but is instead found in one’s capacity 
to endure them and locate redemptive satisfactions even while they 
injure. Experience is here enriched by recognition that while one 
settles for less than one would wish, one has not compromised one’s 
deepest commitments. In this, we might say that winning the best 
life one can get comes coupled with a sense that one will feel as well 
as one can given what fate has offered. (434–435)
Olberding seems to here argue for a version of the resolute sacrifice 
conception on which the virtuous person is disposed to value and 
enjoy the, perhaps small and simple, conventional goods that she has 
even if (in conventional terms) her life is marred by loss or failure. 
In addition, she argues that the virtuous person can enjoy positive 
self-regard when reflecting on her strong-willed commitment to 
virtue and the fact that this trait puts her in the company of noble 
exemplars. These moves are, I think, plausible and point us towards 
the best version of the resolute sacrifice conceptionˌwhich is in-
cidentally the version endorsed by Kant23ˌbut even this improved 
version of the view can only explain some of the didactic passages; 
it runs into problems in two sorts of cases.
To identify the first set of problem cases, we need to distinguish 
between three kinds of conventional misfortune that can befall the 
virtuous.
23 See, for example, Baxley (2010b) and Walschots (2017).
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Victim of Misfortune: The person suffers an absence a conventional 
good due to bad luck.
Victim of Vice: The person suffers an absence of a conventional 
good due to someone else’s vicious activities.
Rejection of Vicious Goods: The person foregoes a conventional 
good either because it is itself ethically bad (e.g. unjust profit or 
pleasure in an enemy’s suffering), because the available means to 
obtain it involve shameful or vicious activity (e.g. debasing oneself 
or slandering a competitor in order to win a promotion), or because 
general conventional attachment to the goods is inimical to virtue 
(e.g. desiring the power that comes when one is admired by bad but 
influential people).
In cases of the first two sorts, the resolute sacrifice conception looks 
quite good, as evidenced by reflection on cases from the Analects. 
First, assuming that Yan Hui died of natural causes his death consti-
tutes a case in which Confucius was a victim of misfortune. The 
resolute sacrifice conception of virtue holds that it is virtuous to 
have ordinary attachments to conventional goods and aversions to 
bads so it can picture the virtuous person in this kind of case being 
beside himself at his prudential loss, in something like the way that 
Confucius is pictured at 11.9–10. Normally, when one is a victim of 
significant misfortune, the virtuous will manifest their attachment 
to the relevant (absent) conventional goods with negative emotions 
(e.g. regret, anger, or grief) and behavior (mourning, lamenting, etc.) 
and by downgrading their overall degree of satisfaction with the 
way their life is turning out. Second, Confucius’ failure to obtain a 
professional post and influence rulers as he would like to is pre sum-
ably in good part due to other people’s vicious activities so these 
cases provide examples of being a victim of vice. Here again, the 
resolute sacrifice conception plausibly affirms that the virtuous will 
have and manifest attachment to the conventional goods that they 
have been robbed of by the vicious way of the world. Finally, in all 
of these cases, Olberding could plausibly add that the virtuous will 
still take pleasure in the little things and feel good about themselves 
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because they are resolutely committed to the high road of virtue and 
that places them in the company of admirable exemplars.
To see that the resolute sacrifice conception gets into trouble in 
rejected vicious goods cases, we should consider passages such as 4.5 
and 7.16:
The Master said, “Eating plain food and drinking water, having only 
your bent arm for a pillowˌcertainly there is joy to be found in this! 
Wealth and eminence attained improperly concern me no more 
than the floating clouds.”
The Master said, “Wealth and social eminence are things that all 
people desire, and yet unless they are acquired in the proper way I 
will not abide them.” Poverty and disgrace are things that all people 
hate, and yet unless they are avoided in the proper way I will not 
despise them.”
The resolute sacrifice conception can affirm that the virtuous will 
not choose to keep improperly acquired conventional goods such 
as wealth and social eminence, and that they can find joy even while 
being upset to be missing conventional goods such as fine food 
and a soft pillow, but these passages reflect the further idea that the 
virtuous, unlike ordinary people, are not attached to conventional 
goods that are improperly obtained or avoided. More generally, the re-
solute sacrifice conception will not be able to explain passages that 
suggest that there are ordinary attachments to conventional goods 
that the virtuous will characteristically lack and not just willfully 
regulate and choose against.24  
To identify the second set of problem cases for the resolute con-
ception, we need to recall that ordinary attachments to conven-
tional goods are often reflected in people’s self-regarding attitudes 
and judgments. For example, people are often ashamed and not 
just dismayed when they fall into poverty or face rejection by the 
popular and powerful. According to the resolute sacrifice conception 
24 For example, 4.9, 6.11, 7.19, and 15.32.
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these sorts of effects need not be undercut or transcended when 
one becomes virtuous. As mentioned at the outset, on the resolute 
sacri fice view, the virtuous person’s judgements and feelings about 
how her life as a whole is turning out, about how well or poorly she 
has lived her life, and about herself all reflect ordinary attachments 
to conventional factors such as her social standing or rejection, her 
material wealth or poverty, or her health and sickness. Of course, as 
Olberding suggests, the virtuous person will feel good about herself 
in virtue of her resolute commitment and will to follow the high road 
and the fact that this puts her in the company of exemplars such as 
Confucius. Nonetheless if someone with this sort of moral or ethical 
self-respect or self-satisfaction is still attached to conventional goods 
in ordinary ways, she will also be liable to feeling pride when she is 
promoted thanks to the approval of bad people and shame when 
she has only stained and torn cloths to wear to a fancy dinner or 
reception after a lecture. Her ordinary conventional attachments 
will not touch or undermine her feelings about her degree of moral 
rectitude, but they certainly will still shape how happy she is with her 
character and herself.
This is a problem for the resolute conception because there are 
many didactic passages in the Analects that suggest that the virtuous 
person’s evaluative sense of self (as manifest in feelings of self-respect, 
self-esteem, pride, shame, etc.) is staked on her degree of virtue and 
not affected by her conventional status and fortune. For example, 
consider Analects 4.9 and 4.14:
The Master said, “A scholar-official who has set his heart upon the 
Way, but who is still ashamed of having shabby clothing or meager 
rations, is not worth engaging in discussion.
“Do not be concerned that no one has heard of you, but rather strive 
to become a person worthy of being known.”
In general, I believe that many passages suggest that, on Confucius’ 
view, the virtuous base their sense of self-respect and self-esteem on 
their degree of virtue (which makes them worthy of being known) 
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instead of social approbation or the positional goods they do or do 
not have. And these are passages that the resolute sacrifice con cep-
tion cannot explain.25
At this point it makes sense to pause and sum up the argument so 
far. In the last section, we saw that the shedding concern conception 
can explain all the dramatic and didactic passages, but, in this sec-
tion, we have seen that while the resolute sacrifice conception can 
explain all of the dramatic passages, it can only explain some of 
the didactic onesˌit runs into the two sorts of problem cases just 
discussed. So, when it comes to exegetical assessment, the shedding 
concern conception looks a bit better. Of course, even if the shedding 
concern conception can explain more passages of the text than the 
resolute sacrifice conception, we should keep in mind the other 
negative conclusion that we reached about the shedding concern 
conception in the last section, namely that it offends ordinary 
pre-theoretical sensibilities (recall the case of Sue who misses her 
dead spouse). With that in mind, we might be tempted to think that 
the resolute sacrifice conception is still better than the shedding 
concern in one important respect. However, this is a conclusion we 
should resist; as I will now explain, the resolute sacrifice conception 
clashes with ordinary pretheoretical sensibilities just as the shedding 
concern conception does. 
To see why the resolute sacrifice view clashes with ordinary 
pre theoretical sensibilities, note that in a wide variety of cases it is 
admirable or more virtuous to lack ordinary attachments to con-
ventional goods. In many cases, full virtue requires not just that we 
master or willfully overcome conventional attachments and their 
psychological effects, but that we rid ourselves of those attachments 
and effects. This is a matter of ordinary intuition and something 
that is affirmed by ordinary pretheoretical sensibilities, and yet the 
resolute sacrifice view denies it.
25 Interestingly, Olberding mentions these passages when first surveying the didactic 
passages but she does not return to them when arguing that we should adopt her view. 
See her discussion starting with, “Confucius’ lauding of exemplars” (2013, 422–423).
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For example, consider Brandon, who is attached to praise and 
recognition from his boss and therefore greatly affected by his boss’s 
attitudes about gender norms and many other things. Brandon’s boss 
thinks women should stay home and raise their kids and that men 
should not have to do any housework. He looks down on, and is less 
likely to favor, men who disagree or whose wives do not conform to 
these norms. This leads Brandon to dislike his wife’s quest to find a 
part time job and wish that he could tell her to drop it. It also leads 
him to resent or at least be more averse to doing housework and wish 
that his wife would do it all. If his boss found out that he was doing 
his fair share he would feel ashamed in the face of his boss’ derision. 
Next, assume that virtue requires Brandon to support his wife’s quest 
to have a part time job and that it also requires him to do his fair 
share of the house work. Moreover, imagine that Brandon recognizes 
this and willfully forces himself to encourage his wife and to grit his 
teeth and fold the laundry on a regular basis. In this case, Brandon is 
not a vicious person because of his less-than-virtuous desires for his 
wife to drop her quest and do all the housework, but those desires 
nonetheless hold him back from being fully virtuous. They are desires 
to treat his wife in vicious (objectionably nonvirtuous) ways. We 
might even imagine Brandon noticing this and wishing that he could 
be a fully virtuous person and be able to wholeheartedly encourage 
his wife and do his share of the housework. He might recognize that 
his attachment to his boss’ approval, and perhaps to advancing his 
career, is at odds with virtue because it leads him to have vicious 
desires that stand in the way of his treating his wife as he would want 
to be treated if her were in her shoes. 
I take it that this is just one of numerous cases in which ordinary 
pretheoretical sensibilities will conflict with the resolute sacrifice 
conception. That conception would have us believe that while virtue 
requires us to have a resolute will to choose the virtuous path, it is 
also compatible with attachment to the bad or vicious path when 
that attachment is caused or motivated by an ordinary attachment 
to some conventional good. It would have us, implausibly, conclude 
that Brandon is already fully virtuous as long as he overmasters his 
desire and forces himself to do the right thing. So, it turns out that 
*ZILNWZL+WSMTM\QVLL ࿼ፎ"
34  Volume 33 /Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
both the shedding concern and resolute sacrifice conceptions of 
virtue conflict with ordinary pretheoretical sensibilities.
5.  
We can sum up the results of our discussion so far as follows. The 
resolute sacrifice conception plausibly insists that the virtuous have 
a resolute willˌa commitment and disposition to effectively choose 
ˌto be virtuous even at the price of various conventional goods. 
Unlike the shedding concern conception, it allows or even requires 
that the virtuous have attachments to conventional goods just as 
ordinary people do. However, it errs in holding that the virtuous 
can or will have all the kinds of attachments to conventional goods 
that ordinary people do and that all virtue requires is a resolute will 
to “resolutely regulate,” these desires so that they never “trump” or 
“overmaster” our desire for virtue (Olberding 2013, 433). The truth, 
however, will be found in a middle ground view on which virtue 
involves the transcendence of some but not all ordinary attachments 
to conventional goods. In some cases, having an attachment to 
a conventional good and choosing virtue anyway is not enough 
for virtueˌthere are some kinds of ordinary attachments that the 
virtuous lack so they will not have to exercise will power to regulate 
them or feel upset later that they did not get the object of the re-
levant attachment. Meanwhile, in other cases, such as the victim of 
misfortune and the victim of vice cases, virtue will be compatible 
with or even require an attachment to the relevant conventional 
goods. Among other things, such attachment shows that we are 
human and recognize that conventional goods, which are subject to 
external fate, are indeed part of the good life.
To develop a third way conception of virtue that we can apply to 
the Analects, I suggest that we return to, and improve on, the idea of 
self-determining virtue (additions in italics).
Wholehearted Internalized Virtue: Full virtue involves (a) im-
proving one’s character, interactions with others, and activities, 
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(b) fully appreciating and valuing virtue in oneself and others, (c) 
noticing and fully disvaluing the actual or potential lack of virtue in 
oneself, and (d) transforming and guiding one’s activity in the light 
of one’s apt appreciation of virtue and its absence in oneself and 
others. For one thing, the self-reflective appreciation of virtue leads 
the virtuous to choose virtue instead of conventional goods if and 
when a choice must be made.
Next, I think we should add two more specific claims in order to ex-
plicate conditions b-d.
Turning Away from Vice: One notices and fully disvalues the 
actual or potential lack of virtue in oneself, only if: (i) one has no 
affective attachment to getting benefits by vicious means and (ii) 
one wholeheartedly chooses to act virtuously when the relevant 
alternative courses of action are vicious or less than fully virtuous.
Appreciating Virtue: One fully appreciates and values virtue in 
oneself and others only if one is: (i) disposed to choose the virtuous 
path even if it requires conventional sacrifice and (ii) one’s core 
affective and cognitive self-assessmentsˌincluding one’s sense of 
self-respect and self-esteemˌare centrally grounded in awareness 
of one’s degree of virtue and vice and not in one’s standing in one’s 
local social, cultural, economic, or political order.
Putting these together, I propose that we conceive of virtue as a 
form of self-determination that involves turning away from vice and 
appreciating virtue, but that also includes those ordinary attachments 
to conventional goods that are not uprooted when we turn away 
from vice and ground our self-assessments in an appreciation of 
virtue’s significance. To be a virtuous human being we need to retain 
those attachments to conventional goods that are compatible with a 
wholehearted and internalized appreciation of virtue and its value.
The wholehearted internalization conception of virtue allows 
that we sometimes suffer a prudential lossˌa reduction in our well-
beingˌwhen we forgo conventional goods, but it sets restrictions on 
how attached we should be to these losses. For example, Brandon 
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may well be worse offˌhave a lower level of well-beingˌif he en-
courages his wife, provokes his boss’ disapproval, and then fails 
to get the next promotion. This would make him a victim of vice 
so he could aptly be upset about not getting the promotion. But in 
order to be virtuous he would need to more fully turn away from 
vice: he would need to uproot his affective attachment to gaining 
a promotion by vicious means and become able to wholeheartedly 
choose to act virtuously. And this would presumably involve coming 
to care less about his boss’ approval and perhaps to care less about 
his promotion. Becoming virtuous may, as this illustrates, attenuate 
or discipline our attachments to conventional goods without ex-
tinguishing them.
This view does better than the resolute sacrifice conception be-
cause it gets results in line with ordinary pretheoretical sensi bilities 
in cases like the Brandon one. By extension, it fits unchosen vicious 
goods passages from the Analects, such as 7.16:
The Master said, “Eating plain food and drinking water, having only 
your bent arm for a pillowˌcertainly there is joy to be found in this! 
Wealth and eminence attained improperly concern me no more 
than the floating clouds.”
This passage suggests that the virtuous person is unattached to wealth 
and eminence attained by vicious means, and while the resolute 
sacrifice conception could not support that claim, the whole hearted 
internalization conception can. The virtuous person is unattached to 
such wealth and eminence because she has turned away from vice. 
In addition, the wholehearted internalization con ception is tailored 
to capture the fact that the virtuous stake their sense of self on virtue 
and not conventional goods such as the quality or fashionableness 
of one’s clothing or the approval of vicious but powerful people 
like Brandon’s boss. So, this interpretation can easily explain, for 
example, why it is virtuous of Zilu to feel no shame while being 
dressed in, “only a shabby quilted gown” (9.27).
Summing up, the wholehearted internalization conception of 
virtue effectively combines the strengths of the resolute sacrifice and 
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shedding concern conceptions, but it has further strengths that allow 
it to avoid the defects that bedevil those other views. It allows us to 
provide a more unified reading of both the dramatic and didactic 
passages of the Analects. And it ascribes a conception of virtue to 
Confucius that fits well with our (current) ordinary pretheoretic 
sensibilities. So, all things considered, it looks like the right one to 
ascribe to the Analects.26
6. 
Now that we have three conceptions of virtue on the table and have 
seen that the wholehearted internalization conception seems to 
best fit ordinary pretheoretic sensibilities and provide a unified 
interpretation of the Analects, we can return to our starting questions 
about how virtue transforms or transcends ordinary assumptions 
about the importance of conventional goods and conventional suc-
cess. All three of our conceptions entail that the virtuous will choose 
the virtuous path instead of the conventional one if and when they 
conflict. Therefore, to that extent any advocate of virtue will no doubt 
run afoul of parents and politicians who want kids and citizens to 
think and act as if conventional success was the most important thing 
in life. The shedding concern view goes much further and would 
have us believe that the virtuous completely cease to care about 
conventional goods and success. However as I have argued, that 
would put a strain on the relationships or bonds that the virtuous can 
have with more ordinary people. The resolute sacrifice conception 
does better on that score but it provides us with an unsatisfying 
picture of virtue because it fails to account for the way that the 
virtuous are able to wholeheartedly repudiate vice and maintain a 
stable sense of self-respect and esteem, based on virtue, in the face 
of social pressure, disapproval, or disdain. We might say that while 
26 Tiwald (2018) discusses issues that would be relevant to thinking about which 
conception of virtue fits other texts and figures in the Confucian and Neo-Confucian 
tradition. 
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the shedding concern conception pictures the virtuous as slightly 
inhuman, the resolute conception pictures them as all too human 
and insufficiently inspiring. 
The wholehearted internalization conception of virtue hits the 
mean between the extremes and helps us see that some, but only 
some, attachments to conventional goods and success are uprooted 
by virtue and that virtue grounds an admirable and perhaps enviable 
sort of self-respect and self-esteem. Perhaps this points to one of 
the things that allows philosophers to seduce the young away from 
conventional success. Perhaps the young can see that it is not good 
to have one’s self-evaluations tethered to conventional goods such 
as social approval and the accumulation and display of positional 
material goods. That makes not only one’s well-being but even 
one’s sense of self-respect and esteem hostage to external fortune. 
The path of virtue is appealing in this context because it offers us 
a way to secure an inner basis for self-respect and self-esteem that 
will contribute to our well-being regardless of whether we achieve 
conventional success or not.
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